Stalin Digital Archive

Back to Search

Stalin digital archive

Back to Search

Table of Contents

< Previous document Next document >

13 December

- Export Citation
- Export Annotation

View:

By Liakhovetsky, Ivan Mikhailovich (Maisky)

The Complete Maisky Diaries: Volume 1

Image view

Print
Save
Share
Cite

Translation Transcription

Translation

13 December

At M.M. [Litvinov]’s instruction, I acquainted Vansittart with the Franco-Soviet Protocol of 5 December.

Following the refusal of Germany and Poland to participate in an Eastern Pact, the Russians reverted to a joint protocol with the French, signed in Geneva on 5 December 1934. France and the USSR undertook not to enter into negotiations with potential members of

Page 412

the pact that might lead to multilateral or bilateral agreements, which would thus undermine an Eastern Regional Pact. They further undertook never to denounce the protocol and to inform each other of any overture made to them by the parties concerned. Czechoslovakia acceded to the protocol two days later. From Geneva, Litvinov instructed Maisky to inform Vansittart that the protocol was evoked by Hitler’s attempt ‘to sow mistrust’ between the Soviet Union and France through rumours of separate negotiations, ‘now with the USSR, now with France’. But his main concern, shared by Maisky, was of a possible British overture to Germany which might tie French hands; RAN f.1702 op.4 d.472 l.1, Litvinov to Maisky, 7 Dec. 1934, and DVP, 1934, XVII, docs. 415 & 416.

V. was obviously flattered by our attention and confirmed once again that the British government remains in favour of the Eastern Pact, as it was in the summer.

Then we turned to more general questions. We hadn’t seen each other since 9 August, i.e. more than four months: I was on leave for more than two months and when I returned, V. had taken his leave. Today was our first opportunity to meet.

We spoke about the current status of Anglo-Soviet relations. We both acknowledged their significant improvement over the past six months. V. remarked that he thought ‘our summer conversations were a turning point in Anglo-Soviet relations’. I told him that Comrade Litvinov was also pleased with our talks and that he had asked me to convey his feelings to V. Then V. expressed his satisfaction at the successful elimination of the Lena Goldfields problem – a thorn removed from our flesh. Now we could think of the next steps towards the further improvement of our relations.

I supported V. and proposed, as a sort of ‘prelude’, that we run our eyes over the map of the world, to see if we could find a single region where the interests of Britain and the USSR might clash. V. willingly agreed and we began.

I: First of all, the USSR bears no aggressive intentions towards the British Empire. That tsarist fantasy of a campaign against India has been dismissed out of hand by the Soviet government.

V.: We believe that. On my part, I can guarantee that Great Britain nurtures no aggressive designs against the USSR. Geography has taken care of the fact that there can be no mutual suspicion of territorial aggression between the two partners.

Page 48

I: We have established, then, that neither side has reason to fear an attack by the other. This is a very important condition for the improvement of Anglo-Soviet relations.

V.: And what is the current state of your relations with Japan and Germany?

I: Our relations with these two countries are characterized precisely by the presence of strong suspicions that they have aggressive aspirations regarding our territory.

V.: Yes, I receive almost daily reports concerning Germany’s aggressive plans towards the Ukraine. However, you are not alone in being threatened by the Germans. They speak constantly about expansion in all directions – whether to the east, the south, the west, Africa, and so on. Germany is a highly unsettled place today. One can expect all sorts of surprises from there.

I: But let’s return to Anglo-Soviet relations. Apart from the absence of suspicions of territorial aggression, a further highly positive aspect in this area is the fact that Britain and the USSR are not competitors on the world market.

V.: You are absolutely right, and this is a great boon for the development of good relations between our countries. Trade competition always has an unfavourable effect on relations between countries.

I: And sometimes leads even to war.

V.: Yes, even to war, however sad that may be.

I: Now, let us switch to Europe. Our Soviet interest in this part of the world is the following: to maintain peace and to prevent Germany, by all means available to us, from violating peace. What is your British interest?

V.: Our British interest is absolutely identical to yours: to maintain peace and to prevent Germany, by all means available to us, from violating peace.

I: Very good. Our goals coincide fully. Of course, there may be discrepancies in the methods and means of achieving the common goal, but even if such differences were to surface in the future they would nevertheless be of secondary importance.

V.: That’s right. But at the present time there are no disagreements between us even on issues of methods and means. You hold the Eastern Pact to be an instrument of peace – we support it as well. We are also as one now on the question of the League of Nations.

I: Let us turn to the Middle East. Our Soviet interest in this once highly explosive region is as follows: to uphold the independence of Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan and to maintain friendly political and economic relations with them. The USSR, unlike tsarist Russia, has no claims on Constantinople and the Straits. We may say, to paraphrase Bismarck’s

Otto von Bismarck, German chancellor, 1871–90.

famous aphorism, that

Page 49

Constantinople and the Straits are not worth the bones of a single Red Army soldier. Our principled position also precludes us from seizing foreign lands. What is your British interest in the Middle East?

V.: The same as yours. We likewise strive to uphold the independence of the said states, to nurture friendly relations with them, and also to raise their cultural and economic level, since this is important for our trade. We set due store by the USSR’s rejection of any claims on Constantinople, but, after all, you have such excellent relations with Turkey.

I: Finally, the Far East. Our Soviet interest in East Asia consists of the following: peace, the integrity and independence of China, open doors, and the prevention of any Japanese aggression with the help of all means accessible to us. In what does your British interest in the Far East consist?

V.: The same: peace, open doors, and maintaining the status quo in terms of the balance of power. (It struck me that he did not mention the integrity and independence of China while listing the main elements of the British interest in the Far East, though this might have been a chance omission.)

I: I’m glad to hear it. But do all in England think so? I know that there is a group in the Conservative camp which is of the opinion that ‘a nice little war between the USSR and Japan’ would be very beneficial to British interests in the Pacific.

V.: Only a madman could desire a Japanese–Soviet war. It would lead inevitably to world war. The people holding such views are a negligible group without weight in British politics.

I: There is another group, which believes that England has three alternatives: (1) building a powerful navy so that she can defend her interests against Japan independently and effectively; (2) forming an Anglo-American entente; (3) forming an Anglo-Japanese entente or even an alliance on the basis of a China divided into spheres of influence (the north for Japan, and the centre and south for England). The first alternative is unachievable for financial reasons, the second because of the isolationist tendencies of the USA. So only the third alternative remains – that of an Anglo-Japanese entente.

V.: I agree that the first two alternatives should be excluded. About the Americans now. They are grossly mistaken to think that geography insures them against all international troubles. Nonetheless, this conviction is widespread among them and perhaps the experience of an entire generation will be needed for the Americans to be cured of their isolationism. As for an Anglo-Japanese entente, it is as unrealistic as the Anglo-American version. First (even if we leave aside the issue of our virtue), Japan would not agree to a partition. It is clearly set on seizing all East Asia for itself. Second, I very much doubt that one could come to terms with the Japanese on such a complicated and delicate matter as the division of China into spheres of influence. It is hard enough

Page 50

to agree on far simpler matters with the Japanese, such as the restriction of fleets. And you want us to reach agreement on the partition of a country of 400 million.

I: But if the third alternative is also to be discounted, then what does the policy of Great Britain in the Far East consist of?

V.: Caution, and again caution!

I: If you say so, although I do not entirely understand what concrete forms this political line could assume. In any case, our comparison of the interests of the two countries – the USSR and Great Britain – seems to suggest that they do not clash anywhere, including the Far East.

V.: Yes, if we ran our eyes over the entire map of the world, we would find no point at which they conflict. Moreover, the USSR and England have one shared and very important interest: the preservation of peace. This is a good foundation for achieving rapprochement between our two countries.

I expressed satisfaction with the results of our analysis and added that I had talked to Simon on the same subject some five weeks ago. Simon wanted to acquaint the Cabinet with the substance of our conversation. V. raised his eyebrows in astonishment. No, he knows nothing about Simon’s démarche. But he will seek clarification…

I told V. not to worry himself, but decided for myself that Simon, in his usual two-faced way, had obviously not done what he promised.

At that moment V.’s secretary entered the room and whispered something in his ear. V. excused himself, on account of some urgent business, but he asked me to come and see him in a few days’ time to conclude our interesting discussion.

Transcription

Document Details

Document Title13 December

AuthorLiakhovetsky, Ivan Mikhailovich (Maisky)

RecipientN/A

RepositoryN/A

ID #N/A

DescriptionN/A

Date1934 Dec 13

AOC VolumeThe Complete Maisky Diaries: Volume 1

Login Required

Your subscription has expired.