I inquired about the reception of the British démarches in Berlin and Warsaw, of which Vansittart informed me on 12 July.

V. replied that Neurath’s

Konstantin von Neurath, German ambassador in London, 1930–32; foreign minister, 1932–38; Reich protector of Bohemia and Moravia, 1939–41.

attitude was cold and hostile, and Beck’s

Józef Beck, Polish foreign minister and representative at the League of Nations, 1932–39.

– chilly. Both, however, had promised ‘to study the issue’. So far there has been no response from them.

V. then impressed on me once again the British government’s desire to improve Anglo-Soviet relations. ‘A certain improvement is already apparent,’ said Vansittart, ‘but I can see no reason why this process should not go significantly further.’ The USSR is concerned about Britain’s attitude to Germany and Japan, but Simon defined the British government’s position towards the former country in the House on 13 July (I nodded and said that his speech went down well in our country).

Welcoming Russia’s inclusion in the League of Nations, Simon emphasized that the mutual assistance pact would ‘connect Russia with the existing Locarno Treaty’. The statement should have addressed Russia’s fear of isolation, brought about by the conclusion of the Locarno Agreement leading to the ‘war scare’ of 1927. Unlike Maisky and Vansittart, Simon believed deterrence would pave the way to disarmament (Hansard, HC Deb 13 July 1934, vol. 292, cols 691–2). Litvinov indeed attached great significance to the change; but, like Maisky, he remained suspicious of British intentions due to the apparent disagreements within the Foreign Office; DVP, 1934, XVII, doc. 258.

At the earliest suitable opportunity, Simon or another leading Cabinet member will publicly define Britain’s attitude to Japan and emphasize that the British government is interested in securing peace in the Far East no less than in Europe. This should satisfy the Soviet government.

V., however, has a complaint of his own to make concerning the conduct of the Soviet press, which not infrequently accuses Britain of setting Japan and Germany against the USSR. The tone of the Soviet press hampers the improvement of relations, and he would very much like my help in altering it. The point is not that the Soviet press should stop criticizing Britain, or that the British press should stop criticizing the USSR. That, of course, is impossible. But it is desirable to avoid direct accusations that Britain is preparing for war against the USSR, which only serve the cause of elements hostile to Anglo-Soviet rapprochement in the press and in parliament (‘all the more so as such suspicions are absolutely unfounded’).

I replied that although I could fully sympathize with V.’s feelings and intentions, I could hardly agree with his criticisms of the conduct of our press. The press only reflects attitudes prevalent in wide circles of the Soviet population. Why are these attitudes so hostile towards Britain? The question hardly calls for lengthy explanations. The nineteenth century has undoubtedly left a burdensome legacy, while the Soviet period has been characterized by Britain’s unceasing struggle against the young workers’ and peasants’ state. Is it surprising that the Soviet masses have grown to regard Great Britain as their enemy? I am delighted that a turn for the better seems to be emerging in Anglo-Soviet relations. But even I only learnt about it from V. a mere fortnight ago. A considerable period of time will be needed to change the mind-sets of the Soviet masses, even if the turn, which I have just mentioned, is reinforced and persists. But, for now, no miracles can be expected either from the Soviet masses or the Soviet press.

V. agreed, but he asked my assistance in accelerating the process of re-educating Soviet public opinion, without which it would be difficult to establish amicable relations between our countries.