“Thesis on the Conditions of Admission to the Communist International,” in Theses, Resolutions and Manifestos of the First Four Congresses of the Third International (London: Inks Press, 1980), 93. The Comintern's 1922 order that the American Communist party end its underground existence reflected its judgment that the American movement, in an excess of conspiratorial zeal, had placed too many of its assets in the underground. The Comintern view was that, given the freedom of American society, the bulk of the Communist movement could operate openly with only necessarily covert activities assigned to the underground.

Rudolf Pikhoia, chairman of the Committee on Archival Affairs of the Russian Federation, estimates the value of the jewels given to Reed to be $1.5 million. See Michael Dobbs, “Yeltsin Aides Seek to Link Gorbachev to Terrorism,” Washington Post, 6 June 1992. Soviet funding of the CPUSA from 1919 to 1989 is described in John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, “ ‘Moscow Gold,’ Confirmed at Last?” Labor History 33, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 279–93, and 33, no. 4 (Fall 1992): 576–78. Part of document I was reproduced in Revelations from the Russian Archives: A Report from the Library of Congress (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1993), 29.

Reed was tried and imprisoned by a Finnish court for illegal border crossing, but Finnish authorities later exchanged him for a Finn held by the Soviet government. See Robert Rosenstone, Romantic Revolutionary: A Biography of John Reed (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), 367; Eric Homberger, John Reed (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990), 204.

Gitlow testimony, 11 September 1939, House Special Committee on Un-American Activities, Investigations of Un-American Propaganda Activities in the United States, 76th Cong., 1st sess., 1939, 7:4687–88.

On Rosenbliett, see Whittaker Chambers, “Statements to the Federal Bureau of Investigation,” January–April 1949, 58–59, Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) document; Adolf Berle's memo of his 1939 interview with Whittaker Chambers, reproduced in Senate Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act, Interlocking Subversion in Government Departments, 83d Cong., 1st sess., 6 May 1953, pt. 6:328–30; Allen Weiustein, Perjury: The Hiss-Chambers Case (New York: Knopf, 1978), 122–1.3. A case similar to Rosenbliett's is that of Julius Heiman. According to Benjamin Gitlow, Heiman arranged to convert the jewels sent by the Comintern in 1920 and 1921 into cash for the American party. During World War II, Heiman reappears as an associate of Arthur Adams, a Soviet spy engaged in nuclear espionage. Adams escaped U.S. government surveillance in 1945 and disappeared (House Committee on Un-American Activities, Report on Soviet Espionage Activities in Connection with the Atom Bomb, 80th Cong., 2d sess., 28 September 1948, 167–77).

Steve Weinberg, Armand Hammer: The Untold Story (Boston: Little, Brown, 1989), 62.

“List of Addresses Found in the Possession of Anton Miller,” Documents Illustrating the Hostile Activities of the Soviet Government and Third International against Great Britain, Russia No. 2, 1927 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1927), 25.

John Costello and Oleg Tsarev, Deadly Illusions (New York: Crown, 1993), 103–9.

Ruthenberg telegram, 11 July 1925, noted as deciphered on 14 July, RTsKhIDNI 515–1–421(I). The last sentence is garbled, probably owing to errors made in coding or decoding the message.

Comintern to Ruthenberg telegram, 13 April 1916, RTsKhIDNI 495–19–613. Ruthenberg also cabled the Comintern to request that the Hammers deliver a late 1926 payment to the party's lawyer, Joseph Brodsky, because the scheduled recipient had died. Ruthenberg to Comintern, 16 November 1926, RTsKhIDNI 495–19–613. The OGPU document quoted is undated, but it is located in a hie labeled 1923–1926. This document is quoted and its provenance is discussed in Jerrold L. Schecter and Yuri A. Buranov, “Documents Tie Hammer to Communists,” We 1, no. 7 (15–18 June 1992): 1, 3.

Weinstone to Secretariat, CPUSA, 6 December 1930, RTsKhIDNI 515–1–1870. Emphasis in the original. The Secretariat was the executive leadership of the CPUSA.

“List of Addresses Found in the Possession of Anton Miller,” 20. When asked about the Arcos documents, Joseph Brodsky, the CPUSA's attorney, suggested that the British government had forged them (Brodsky testimony, 6 September 1939, House Special Committee on Un-American Activities, Investigations of Un-American Propaganda Activities in the United States, 7:4494–95). This and other Comintern documents demonstrate the authenticity of the Arcos documents.

A far more complex cipher for CPUSA use in 1940 was also found. CPUSA cipher instructions, RTsKhIDNl 515–1–4104.

Gitlow testimony, 7 September 1939, House Special Committee on Un-American Activities, Investigations of Un-American Propaganda Activities in the United States, 7:4681. Browder led the American delegation to the 1921 Profintern congress. Crosby is identified as Cosgrove's pseudonym in Theodore Draper, The Roots of American Communism (New York: Viking, 1957), 316.

In the late 1930s, State Department investigators turned up evidence tying Marion Emerson and W. A. Haskell to the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat. Nothing is known of W. A. Haskell (U.S. Department of State Passport Division brief of a conspiracy charge against World Tourists and the CPUSA, reprinted in Senate Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act, Scope of Soviet Activity in the United States, 85th Cong., 1st sess., 1957, app. 1, pt. 23-A:A109, A113). The records of the Special Branch (internal security) of the Shanghai Municipal Police contain extensive surveillance and informant reports on Browder (pseudonym George Morris), Katherine Harris (called Harrison and using the pseudonym Alice Read), Dolson, Dennis (pseudonym Paul Walsh), Undjus, Emerson, and Haskell. See D. S. McKeown report, “History of the Communist Movement in Shanghai,” 8 May 1933, box 1, document 5; Special Branch report, “Earl Browder Alias George Morris,” 30 September 1931, box 6, document 62; D. S. Pitts report, “The Oriental Trading and Engineering Corporation—Activities in China,” 9 June 1937, box 3, document 21; Special Branch report, “Communist Activities in China, Federated Malay States, etc. (The ‘Noulens Case’),” box 4, document 30; all in Record Group 263, Formerly Security Classified Records Relating to Espionage Activities in Shanghai, 1926–1948 (Willoughby Collection), Shanghai Municipal Police Files, National Archives, Washington, D.C. The Shanghai Municipal Police was a British-dominated organization that reported to the Shanghai International Settlement, an international body that ran the commercial center of Shanghai and was jointly controlled by British, French, American, Japanese, and other non-Chinese representatives.

Harris and Browder were reputed to be lovers at the time. In testimony to Congress, Gitlow discussed Harris's work with Browder in the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat at length (Gitlow testimony, 7 September 1939, House Special Committee on Un-American Activities, Investigations of Un-American Propaganda Activities in the United States, 7:4681). The relationship is also elucidated in a U.S. Department of State Passport Division brief of a conspiracy charge against World Tourists and the CPUSA, reprinted in Senate Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act, Scope of Soviet Activity in the United States, A86; and in McKeown, “History of the Communist Movement in Shanghai.”

Browder testimony, 5 September 1939, House Special Committee on Un-American Activities, Investigations of Un-American Propaganda Activities in the United States, 7:4440.

U.S. Department of State Passport Division brief of a conspiracy charge against World Tourists and the CPUSA, reprinted in Senate Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act, Scope of Soviet Activity in the United States, A22.

Ibid., A90, A109–10, A116, A122. Ewert was severely tortured and driven insane. He was released from prison in 1947 and sent to East Germany.

On Victor Barron and the Brazilian coup, see David P. Hornstein, Arthur Ewert: A Life for the Comintern (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1993), 200–203, 207, 267–77; and Fernando Morais, Olga (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1990), 56, 61–62, 65, 82, 94, 108–11, 123–24, 129–33. The short interval between the time Victor contacted his father and the time of his CPUSA-funded travel to die Soviet Union has led several writers to conclude that Harrison recruited Victor for secret work. Hornstein writes: “In 1933, when Harrison George heard of the opening of Mirov-Abramov's Podlipki school in Moscow for Comintern clandestine radio operators and the search for suitable young communists of various nationalities to be trained there for eventual assignment to covert dudes abroad, he used his considerable influence to assure that his son, for whom he continued to feel a sense of responsibility, was one of the first candidates selected“ (202–3). Morais's book tells a similar tale. Although both the Hornstein and Morais volumes are serious books, they are intended for the educated public rather than for scholars and lack documentary citation. In the absence of direct documentation, the authors regard it as possible, but not proven, that George recruited his son.

eggy Dennis, The Autobiography of an American Communist; A Personal View of a Political Life, 1925–1975 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1977), 39. Peggy Dennis was Eugene's wife.

During or after World War I, a number of states made promoting the violent overthrow of the government a crime. These laws were generally called laws against criminal syndicalism because at the time the chief radical organization advocating violent revolution was the syndicalist Industrial Workers of the World.

There are several pieces of evidence establishing that Harrison George is Fisher. During the 1934 maritime strike on the West Coast, Fisher wrote a series of angry letters to party leaders denouncing the strike strategy of the local Communist leadership. Responding to this criticism, California party leader Sam Darcy referred to Fisher as “Comrade H.G.” See Sam D. [Darcy] to Browder, 22 June 1934, RTsKhIDNI 515–1–3613.

Al Richmond, A Long View from the Left: Memoirs of an American Revolutionary (New York: Delta, 1972), 277. Richmond also noted that Harrison George was an avid fisherman; the hobby may have given rise to the Fisher pseudonym. In 1947, after his expulsion from the CPUSA for ideological deviation, George published a pamphlet defending his views and calling for internal party reform. One chapter was called “Principles of Party Cleansing from Below,” a title that greatly amused those familiar with George's particular health enthusiasm. See Harrison George, The Crisis in the C.P.U.S.A. (Privately printed, December 1947).

Document 20 also deals with “Comrade Gerhart.” This is Gerhart Eisler, a German Communist who Carried out Comintern missions in many countries, including America. Browder says that after discussing the issue with four leading Comintern officials (Wilhelm Pieck [a German who later became president of the German Democratic Republic], Dmitry Manuilsky [a Russian], Otto Kuusinen [a Finn], and Ercoli [the pseudonym of the Italian Communist Palmiro Togliatti]), he wanted Eisler to return to the United States. Eisler did, in fact, return.

House Committee on Un-American Activities, Investigation of Communist Activities in the San Francisco Area—Part 5 (5 December 1953), 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 1954, 3422–28.

Herbert L. Packer, Ex-Comtnunist Witnesses: Four Studies in Fact Finding (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1962,), 188.

Although the army officially withdrew the charges against Smedley, Willoughby did not (Charles Andrew Willoughby, Shanghai Conspiracy: The Sorge Spy Ring, Moscow, Shanghai, Tokyo, San Francisco, New York [New York: Dutton, 1951]).

Janice R. MacKinnon and Stephen R. MacKinnon, Agnes Smedley: The Life and Times of an American Radical (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 142.

Manny, sometimes known as Max, was the brother of Communist literary critic Mike Gold. In Shanghai, he was known as Max (D. S. Henchman to HBM Consulate-General, “Eastern,Publishing Company and Max Granich,” 24 June 1937, box 1, document 4, Willoughby Collection).

“Communist Party Manifesto,” reprinted in Joint Legislative Committee Investigating Seditious Activities, Revolutionary Radicalism, Its History, Purpose and Tactics, with an Exposition and Discussion of the Steps Being Taken and Required to Curb It (Albany: J. B. Lyon, 1920), 782. Emphasis in the original.

Daily Worker, 17 October 1929. Symptomatic of the indifference of the American authorities toward the CPUSA in 1929 and the sense of security of CPUSA officials, the Daily Worker openly published a resolution about its intent to form a secret organization.

Victor Navasky, editor of the Nation and a defender of Alger Hiss, agrees that Peters was “a well-known Communist Party official in the 1930s” but notes that he “denied participation in any ‘Communist underground,’” suggesting through the use of quotation marks that there was no such thing. See Victor Navasky, “The Case Not Proved against Alger Hiss,” Nation, 8 April 1978, 395–96. Further, the Nation asked journalist Donald Kirk to stop by Peters's home in Budapest (in 1949 Peters had been arrested and deported) and chat with him. Kirk found Peters to be “a skeptic, an intellectual who cannot help but perceive humor in the posturing and maneuvering.” Kirk quotes him as calling the charge that he did secret work for the American Communist party “nonsense.” “This is so stupid—the ‘secret Communist’ and ‘not-secret Communist,’” Peters said. Kirk felt bad for having “intruded upon the inner contentment” Peters and his wife had achieved “since the turmoil of their lives in America.” In his Hungarian retirement, Peters used the name Joszef Peter. See Donald Kirk, “Checking Up on Peter's Smile,” Nation, 6 May 1978, 525–26.

Although the word chosen to translate the Russian is “secret” apparatus, the Russian word is konspirativnyi, a cognate of the English word “conspiracy,” and the terra could as accurately be translated “conspiratorial apparatus” or “conspiracy apparatus.”

Chambers's defection is described in Allen Weinstein, Perjury: The Hiss-Chambers Case (New York: Knopf, 1978), 306–28. Weinstein's book is the most thorough and complete study of the Hiss-Chambers case.

Karl [Whittaker Chambers], “The Faking of Americans,” Herbert Solow Papers, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University, Stanford, California.

Herbert Solow, “Stalin's American Passport Mill,” American Mercury (July 1939): 302–9.

The case is known as the Robinson-Rubens case because American authorities discovered that the couple had fraudulent American passports under both names.

After leaving the AAA, Weyl directed the CPUSA's School on Wheels; the mobile, classroom toured agricultural areas, its staff tutoring farmers on Communist agricultural policies. He broke his silence about his Communist activities after the Korean War began. He later wrote two books: Treason: The Story of Disloyalty and Betrayal in American History (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1950) and The Battle against Disloyalty (New York: Crowell, 1951) on the nature of disloyalty. Josephine Herbst was a well-known novelist of the 1930s; her husband was John Herrmann. Pressman and Abt, who both became well-known labor lawyers, are discussed below.

John Abt with Michael Myerson, Advocate and Activist: Memoirs of an American Communist Lawyer (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1993), 39–42, 45–46, 178–79.

Robert M. La Follette, Jr., “Turn the Light on Communism,” Collier's, 8 February 1947.

Jerold S. Auerbach, Labor and Liberty: The La Follette Committee and the New Deal (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966), 168.

Communists led or were dominant partners in the leadership of one large CIO union, the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, and seventeen smaller CIO affiliates. By the end of World War II, CIO unions with Communist-aligned leaders represented about 1,370,000 unionists, one-quarter of the CIO's total membership. In addition, Communists were partners, although not dominant ones, in the ruling coalition of the million-member United Auto Workers, the ClO's largest affiliate. Communist unionists also controlled the leadership of many state and local CIO councils, particularly those in New York City, California, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Washington. On the Communist role in the CIO, see Bert Cochran's Labor and Communism: The Conflict That Shaped American Unions (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977); Harvey A. Levenstein's Communism, Anticommunism, and the CIO (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1981); and Max Kampelman's The Communist Party vs. the C.I.O.: A Study in Power Politics (New York: Praeger, 1957).

In 1940 the CPUSA had become savagely hostile to President Roosevelt in accordance with the requirements of the Nazi-Soviet Pact. Communist unionists were uncooperative with the administration's attempts to maintain labor peace in the rapidly expanding armaments industry, and this may have contributed to the Roosevelt administration's decision to move against the Communists inside the NLRB.

The role of Communists in the NLRB in the 1930s is set out in Earl Latham, The Communist Controversy in Washington: From the New Deal to McCarthy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), 124–50.

The reference in the documents to the agency being Roosevelt's “federal commission” should not be taken to mean an executive branch agency, thereby excluding the La Follette committee. To Comintern officials, separation of powers was an unfamiliar concept.

The investigation in the fall of 1938 was followed in the summer and fall of 1939 by highly publicized hearings on the Associated Farmers and other anti-union groups; these hearings exposed their activities and revealed their use of coercion and violence against farm workers who attempted to organize unions (Auerbach, Labor and Liberty, 177—96).

A subsequent volume in this series will reproduce documents definitely establishing Bridges's membership in the CPUSA.

By the fall of 1938, Abt was no longer with the La Follette committee.

In addition to the NLRB, the AAA, and the La Follette committee, other agencies for which there is evidence of an organized Communist presence include the National Youth Administration, the Wheeler committee (Senate committee under Senator Burton K. Wheeler that investigated the railroad industry), the National Research Project of the Works Progress Administration, the Treasury Department, and the Federal Theatre Project. Particularly with reference to the La Follette committee and the NLRB, these documents throw into question such matters as the accepted history of the rise of the CIO and such key events as the bloody Memorial Day clash in 1937 between CIO demonstrators and police outside a Republic Steel plant in South Chicago. Most historians have treated the investigations and information produced by the La Follette committee as essentially free of bias. These documents do not prove, but they do suggest, that the La Follette committee's investigations and the NLRB's neutrality during the era of sharp competition between the AFL and the CIO may have been compromised by the actions of secret Communist caucuses. Historians have long known that John L. Lewis, chief founder of the CIO, made use of Communist organizers in the CIO's formative years. However, the extent to which this relationship was based on negotiation and agreement between CIO leaders and the CPUSA has long been disputed. Lewis never admitted any explicit understanding with the Communists, and most historians have tended to believe that Lewis simply needed a large cadre of organizers in a hurry and made use of the ready availability of dedicated Communist organizers on an individual basis; other scholars have seen at most an unspoken understanding between Lewis and the CPUSA. Documents in the Comintern archives show that the understanding was explicit and the result of active negotiations. Documentation of the negotiations and the agreement between John L. Lewis and Sidney Hillman of the CIO and Earl Browder, William Z. Foster, and Clarence Hathaway of the CPUSA, and of the list of organizers the CPUSA authorized Lewis to hire will be reproduced in a subsequent volume of this series (Clarence Hathaway, “Report of Situation in U.S.A. and Work of Party,” testimony to the Marty Secretariat, 15 September 1936, RTsKhIDNI 515–1–3967, pp. 1–18).

The Comintern's response could not be located.

On Bullitt, Moore, and their relationship with Roosevelt, see Will Brownell and Richard N. Billings, So Close to Greatness: A Biography of William C. Bullitt (New York: Macmillan, 1987); and Orville H. Bullitt, ed., For the President: Personal and Secret Correspondence between Franklin D. Roosevelt and William C. Bullitt (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972).

Dodd's copy of this letter is in box 49, William E. Dodd Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.

Dodd's letter ultimately reached President Roosevelt, and it is possible that, given their relationship, Moore sent Bullitt's letter and his own comments to Roosevelt as well. It is therefore possible, but much less likely, that the material was secretly copied at the White House rather than at the State Department.

Steve Nelson, James R. Barrett, and Rob Ruck, Steve Nelson, American Radical (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1981), 42, 242–43.

Spivak's role in the Whalen forgeries is described in Herbert Romerstein and Stanislav Levchenko, The KGB against the “Main Enemy” (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1989), 47–53.

Elizabeth Bentley, “Statement to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 30 November 1945,” FOIA document, 26, 29, 67.

Lautner testimony, transcript of proceedings held before the Subversive Activities Control Board in the matter of McCrath vs. Communist Party of the U.S.A., 11 February 1952, pp. 10,009—10,010 (reprinted on microfilm in Records of the Subversive Activities Control Board, 1950–1972, pt. 1*** [Frederick, Md.: University Press of America, 1988], reel 17). In the purge trial of Hungarian Communist leader Laszlo Rajk (later executed), Stalin's agents fabricated evidence linking Rajk to American intelligence through Lautner, a twenty-year veteran of the CPUSA and a leader of its work among Hungarian-Americans. During World War II, Lautner entered the U.S. Army, where his Hungarian background and language skills led to his assignment to military intelligence and psychological warfare (propaganda) work, during the course of which he had contact with some Hungarian Communists. This contact formed the basis for the charge that Lautner was an agent of American intelligence who had subverted various Hungarian Communists. American Communist leaders interrogated Lautner at gunpoint and expelled him from the CPUSA as an “enemy of the working class.” Joe Brandt and Saul Wellman, who had served in the International Brigades as political commissars, conducted the interrogation. Lautner's wife, a loyal Communist, left him. The evidence against Lautner was entirely false. After this experience, Lautner testified freely about his Communist career. Lautner's story is related in his testimony, 10 July 1953, Senate Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act, Communist Underground Printing Facilities and Illegal Propaganda, 83d Cong., 1st sess., 1953, 333–26; Herbert L. Packer, Ex-Communist Witnesses: Four Studies in Fact Finding (Stanford, Calif,: Stanford University Press, 1962), 178–220; and Joseph R. Starobin, American Communism in Crisis, 1943–1957 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), 218–19, 306n.

Darcy to Organizational Commission, 16 May 1934, RTsKhIDNl 515–1–3613.

John L. Spivak, A Man in His Time (New York: Horizon Press, 1967), chaps. 30–33.

Nelson, Barrett, and Ruck, Steve Nelson, 242.

In this interview, Nelson also denied knowledge of CPUSA covert operations against Trotskyists and Lovestoneists. Nelson also stated that historians should not use documents found in any Soviet archive (John Haynes's phone interview with Steve Nelson, 31 August 1992.). In his memoir, Nelson mentioned a relationship with Baker in four places and noted that he had shared an apartment with him for a time (Nelson, Barrett, and Ruck, Steve Nelson, 28, 42, 51, 125).

Benjamin Gitlow, The Whole of Their Lives (New York: Scribner's, 1948), 141; Lovestone to Ella, 19 October 1926, RTsKhIDNI 515–1–763.

Earl Latham, The Communist Controversy in Washington: From the New Deal to McCarthy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), 81–85; Romerstein and Levchenko, The KGB against the “Main Enemy,” 11–13. The remark about Mrs. Mendelsohn also strengthens stones linking Lovestone romantically with Mrs. Mendelsohn. Gitlow and Lovestone adopted different varieties of anti-communism. Gitlow moved into conservative anti-Communist circles, whereas Lovestone remained on the left and devoted himself to the anti-Communist wing of the labor movement. He became the chief adviser on foreign policy to George Meany, head of the AFL and, later, of the AFL-CIO. Lovestone supervised the AFL's highly successful program of helping noncommunist trade unions in Western Europe beat back a determined Communist attempt to dominate the Western European labor movement after World War II, a program he later extended worldwide.

Lovestone testimony, 2 December 1939, House Special Committee on Un-American Activities, Congressional Investigation of Un-American Propaganda, vol. 11 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1940), 7147.

The FBI examined the files but did not remove them. The FBI's examination became public because Judith Coplon, a Soviet spy working at the justice Department, stole the FBI report on the break-in. The FBI, in turn, arrested Coplon in 1949 in the act of turning over the report and other FBI counterintelligence material to a Soviet diplomat. The report became an exhibit in Coplon's ensuing trial (defense exhibit 119, United States v. Judith Coplon [criminal case 381–49], United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 10 June 1949), The FBI report does not explicitly state that the information on the files at Levy's residence derived from a warrentless entry, but it is worded in such a way that this is the most likely explanation. Coplon is discussed further in chapter 8.

Nelson, Barrett, and Ruck, Steve Nelson, 241–43.

Minerich's statement to the American Commission of the Anglo-American Secretariat, 1 January 1930, RTsKhIDNI 495–72–118.

Louis Budenz affidavit, 11 November 1950, House Committee on Un-American Activities, American Aspects of the Assasination of Leon Trotsky, 81st Cong., 2d sess., 1950, v–ix; Issac Don Levine, The Mind of an Assassin (New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1959); Romerstein and Levchenko, The KGB against the “Main Enemy,” 165–75; Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story (New York: HarperCollins, 1990), 154–56. Franklin's grand jury testimony, which dealt with her infiltration of the Trotskyists as well as her role in the Soble-Soblen spy ring, was obtained by a Trotskyist group under an FOIA request and reprinted as Confession of a GPU Spy (London: New Park Publications, 1983). Franklin used the aliases Caldwell and Doxsee. When captured, Mornard Carried a forged Canadian passport in the name of Frank Jacson.

Jabotinsky (here spelled Zhabotinsky) was one of the major figures in the history of modern Zionism. The contemporary Likud party of Israel is a successor to the Jabotinsky movement.

On Murashoff's GPU status, see Delgass testimony, 25 November 1930, House Special Committee to Investigate Communist Activities in the United States, Investigation of Communist Propaganda, 71st Cong., 2d sess., 1930, pt. 1, vol. 4:210; on Dourmashkin's work for Novy mir, see P. Fatoff's letter of 7 April 1930, ibid., pt. 3, vol. 2:26.

R. Baker to Dimitrov, Russian translation, RTsKhIDNI 495–74–472.

General Pavel Mikhailovich Fitin was head of the foreign intelligence directorate of the NKVD from 1940 to 1946 and the Soviet Union's chief intelligence official.

A copy of the report on Max was not present in the file.

Robert Rosenstone, Crusade on the Left: The Lincoln Battalion in the Spanish Civil War (New York: Pegasus, 1969), 113, 311.

“American total tally as of Oct. 1, 1937,” RTsKhIDNI 545–6–5. Original in English.

Killed in action list, RTsKhIDNI 545–6–21.

Surveillance report on Bertram Wolfe, September 1937, from Barcelona, RTsKhIDNI 545–6–1015.

Wolfe in his later life became a renowned scholar of Spanish literature and of Soviet communism.

Testimony of Maxwell M. Wallach, 12 April 1940, House Special Committee on Un-American Activities, Investigation of Un-American Propaganda Activities in the United States, 76th Cong., 3d sess., 1940, 13:7732.

The Subversive Activities Control Board was charged with registering and making public certain information about Communist-controlled organizations. All of the organizations that it attempted to register fought the SACB's actions successfully in court, no organizations ever registered under the law, and eventually the SACB was abolished. While in existence, however, it conducted lengthy hearings about organizations that it felt were Communist controlled.

The Lincoln battalion fought at Belchite twice. In 1937 Belchite was the site of a major Lincoln battalion victory during a Republican offensive; in 1938 the site of the initial defeat in a disastrous retreat that sent Republican forces back behind the Ebro River.

Anarcho-syndicalism envisioned the abolition of private property and the replacement of the political state by a voluntary association of labor unions and worker cooperatives. Hostile to communism because of Communist support for an all-powerful political state dominated by the Communist party, anarcho-syndicalists remained a significant force in France and Spain until the end of the 1930s.

Testimony of William Horan, 1250–1251.

A 1934 letter from Lapin/Dirba of the CPUSA Central Control Commission notes that “he has again become irresponsible, habitually drinking, etc.,” and indicates that McCuiston was expelled from and readmitted to the party at least once (Lapin to Organizational Commission, 22 January 1934, RTsKhIDNI 515–1–3509).

Testimony of William C. McCuiston, 12 April 1940, House Special Committee on Un-American Activities, Investigation of Un-American Propaganda Activities in the United States, 13:7828.

Testimony of Humberto Galleani, 12 April 1940, House Special Committee on Un-American Activities, Investigation of Un-American Propaganda Activities in the United States, 13:7816.

In 1949 the CIO denounced the United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers of America as Communist controlled and expelled it.

Testimony of Anthony De Maio, 12 April 1940, House Special Committee on Un-American Activities, Investigation of Un-American Propaganda Activities in the United States, 13:7804, 7807.

Rosenstone, Crusade on the Left, 374. Rosenstone indicates that those executed, if any, were few. Peter Carroll puts the number executed at less than ten (Peter N. Carroll, The Odyssey of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade: Americans in the Spanish Civil War [Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1994], 184–88).

Personal questionnaire filled out by hand and signed by Anthony De Maio, Comissariado de Guerra de las Brigadas Internacionales, 13 November 1938, RTsKhIDNI 545–6–880; biographical extract on Anthony De Maio, “Extractos de la biografia escrita el 20.9.38,” 20 September 1938, RTsKhIDNI 545–6–880.

On the nature of the International Brigades' SIM, see R. Dan Richardson, Comintern Army: The International Brigades and the Spanish Civil War (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1981), 161; Stanley Payne, The Spanish Revolution (New York: Norton, 1970), 346–47; Verle Johnston, Legions of Babel: The International Brigades in the Spanish Civil War (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1967), 105. Orlov later defected. See John Costello and Oleg Tsarev, Deadly Illusions (New York: Crown, 1993).

This document also states that Wallach spent some time at Camp Lukas, an International Brigades rear area facility. McCuiston in his 1940 testimony stated that he had seen both De Maio and Wallach at Camp Lukas.

“Wallach, Albert, americano, periodista …,” 11 July 1938, RTsKhIDNI 545—6—1008.

When Wallach died is not clear. Palega in his 1939 letter quoted above stated he feared Wallace was executed in July 1938. However, document 47, De Maio's report on Wallach, is dated 26 September 1938 and is written in a way that implies he was alive at that time. If the latter is the case, he could not have been, as some defenders of the International Brigades have suggested, subsequently released from prison, sent to the front, and killed in combat. In September 1938 the Spanish Republic ordered its international volunteers to demobilize; the American battalions fought their last action on 14 September and withdrew from the front. The first large group of American volunteers left Spain in December, with the rest following in the next several months. Albert Wallach never returned.