TO COMRADE STALIN.

After the rejection of the proposal of the delegation regarding including Evert and Schuman in the Central Committee, the delegation spoke at the Lord Convention with a declaration stressing the risk of that type of organizational policy. The unanimous opinion of the delegation was that the party is put at risk by the personal dictatorship of Ruth Fischer, who is electing such a Central Committee that with its help she can control the party without any control by the Comintern, RKP and party membership. The Parteitag has indicated the danger in any further diplomacy between Ruth Fischer and the Comintern and RKP and the mechanical alignment of the German party with Ruth Fischer. All initiative in the party has been squashed, there was almost no discussion at the Parteitag and Ruth’s report had no analysis or perspective — a simple agitational speech at a mass meeting — showed that only in collective leadership is the key to a normal development of the party. The youth that stood in solidarity with the proposals b the delegation of the RKP and the Comintern was subjected to attacks from the supporters of Ruth Fischer to the same degree that they attacked all the elements that stood for firm organizational ties with Moscow. In entering our statement we want to reach a posing of the “German question” before the Executive Committee of the Comintern. If now, in a moment of financial bankruptcy of the GCP in the face of our heaviest losses in the trade unions and industry, we do not put decisive pressure to attain changes in the position of the German party and a full liquidation of the last remains of the Kaapedist tendencies, it will be very difficult to do so later.

In terms of measures, the delegation proposes 1) ending the regime of personal dictatorship in the Central Committee by Ruth Fischer and moving the workers’ group headed by Telman to the forefront. 2) The Executive Committee sending out an authoritative commission to go to Germany proper with the right to take urgent action and normalizing the internal party situation. 3) Sending orders for the party organizations. 4) Constant presence and control by the Profintern over the work in trade unions, with an assignment of members of the Central Committee to the largest unions and establishing their personal responsibility. 5) Reviewing with the entire national CCK all the cases regarding expelling people from the German Party over the past year. 6) A serious internal party discussion about a new course of the political line and regarding the methods of organizational Bolshevization.

Only a tighter dependence of the GCP on the Comintern and vigilant control can help the party escape the coming crisis. A detailed report will come in written form. Manuilskiy.

Copies forbidden.

CODE Sent from Sochi 1 — 17 23 / VII 1925. Received in Shifrburo [Bureau of Codes] of the Central Committee of the RKP for decoding 24/ VII 1925 h. 19 m. 25 Vh # 1730/ Sh

MOSCOW CCRKP to comrades BUKHARIN and MANUILSKIY. —

1) It seems Polsch and Ruth Fischer have silently united against the IKKi in the face of danger from the side of the former Brandlerovites, i.e. Evart and Schuman;

2) It is difficult to fix the matter now, the Parteitag is over, the membership of the new Central Committee has been sanctioned by the Parteitag, Ruth Fischer has vote of the Parteitag, her position is formally invulnerable, Ruth Fischer can say that she simply did not take our advice on the membership of the Central Committee, which she had every right to do;

3) The German delegation needs to be taken in, we need to stress the harm of Ruth Fischer’s politics, we need to say openly that the IKKI and the RKP are decisively against Ruth Fischer’s sectarian politics, we need to say this not just in passing, but also at the IKKI Presidium, which needs to be informed about all of this, but moving beyond that at this moment and making an open attack about Evart and Schuman I don’t believe is wise.

4) The conference for the review of the Parteitag decision is not a good idea. If there really is a working group headed by Telman, we need to take it up firmly and direct our course in its direction.

5) We need to finally firmly take up the financial matter of the German Communist Party; we need to boot out and punish all the petty thieves and spenders of the party till, establish strict financial control by the IKKI and RKP, we neeeeddd to maximally reduce the money given out to the Germans having reported on all of that to the Presidium of the IKKI. No flexibility on this question.

6) Seeing as… Ruth Fischer ruins and corrupts the German Communist party, the IKKI has no right to pity her, it needs to pose the goal of fully exposing her, as a method of making the party healthy, approaching that goal firmly and calmly without worrying, no diplomacy. This will be the only true and honest policy. As a result of such a policy, either Ruth Fischer will improve or she will be forced to step back, making room for better people among the German communists. # 29.

—

STALIN. —

Decoded on 15/ VII 1925 at h. 11 m. 30 Printed in 4 copies. Signed Chupznov and Chistyakov

Drawn from the instructions:

1. The coded telegram should only be kept in secret locations.

2. In referencing the text of coded telegrams it is forbidden to indicate that the quoted text was received in code; likewise it is forbidden to indicate the numbers of coded messages.

3. A response to a coded message is to be sent also in coded form, the text of the code … is put together succinctly and clearly: it is to be written only as one copy, which is passed on to be encrypted.

Today was a long conference with the German delegation: Geschke, Schneller, Neumann, Kuhne (Berlin). They came with a plan to demand the disavowal of Manuilskiy. After a conversation with between Bukharin and Rykov and Molotov, we began with a strong counterattack on your front. The reserve funds, separate policies, non-elections to professional commissions, refusing the recommended makeup of the Tseka [Central Committee], the appalling bullying of the IKKI delegation in the case with the subsidies, everything was put out Ruth’s dictatorship — everything was put out. There were threats, when necessary, of exposure and appeals to the workers. Then they went over to the defense … position and started stammering. It ended for now with their statement that they will heal the party together with us. Propos They are proposing to bring in Ruth Teddy and also both of you. We have agreed and are supporting that proposal. We have already sent a telegram to Germany. Most of all we are asking you not to give them uncoordinated separate directives, but to write to them only through us, because they profit off of disagreements. We told them … … We believe that we need to insist firmly on all of our decisions, because otherwise they will be completely perverted. Manuilskiy spoke not on … at the congress by their recommendation. We are not receiving an answer to our requests. Reply carefully and quickly. Do you intend to come or what are you proposing instead.

Today was a long conference with the German delegation: Geschke, Schneller, Neumann, Kuhne (Berlin). They came with a plan to demand the disavowal of Manuilskiy. After a conversation with between Bukharin and Rykov and Molotov, we began with a strong counterattack on your front. The reserve funds, separate policies, non-elections to professional commissions, refusing the recommended makeup of the Tseka [Central Committee], the appalling bullying of the IKKI delegation in the case with the subsidies, Ruth’s dictatorship — everything was put out. There were threats, when necessary, of exposure and appeals to the workers. Then they went over to the defense … position and started stammering. It ended for now with their statement that they will heal the party together with us. They are proposing to bring in Ruth Teddy and also both of you. We have agreed and are supporting that proposal. We have already sent a telegram to Germany. Most of all we are asking you not to give them uncoordinated separate directives, but to write to them only through us, because they profit off of disagreements. We believe that we need to insist firmly on all of our decisions, because otherwise they will be completely perverted. Manuilskiy spoke at the congress by their recommendation. We are not receiving an answer to our requests. Reply carefully and quickly. Do you intend to come or what are you proposing instead. Bukharin. Manuilskiy. Pyatnitskiy. Kuusinen.

24/ VII — 25

Moscow Central Committee of the RKP. To comrade TOVSTUKHA FOR NIKOLAI

From Sochi 3311 69 25 15 36

Received yours from 24. Answering all questions carefully. Could not make out your proposal due to equipment, send other equipment. Have sent my response to the first telegram immediately, now am sending a second one by mail. I completely agree with your plan. We need to move on a firm line tip the end. # 32. PARSHIN.

Copies forbidden.

CODE

Send from Sochi on 26/ VII 12 — 21 1925. Received in Shifrburo of RKP Central Committee for decoding on 26/ VII 1925 at h. 15 m. 25 VH # 1734/ Sh

MOSCOW CCRKP to comrade BUKHARIN. —

# 7493/ C Received. Press on hard, aim for the maximum, establish the makeup not only of the Politburo but the Orgburo and the editorial staff of the Rote Fahne. # 33.

STALIN

Decoded on 26/ VII 1925 at h. 16 m. 10 Printed in 4 copies. Signed Birgel

Drawn from the instructions:

1. The coded telegram should only be kept in secret locations.

2. In referencing the text of coded telegrams it is forbidden to indicate that the quoted text was received in code; likewise it is forbidden to indicate the numbers of coded messages.

3. A response to a coded message is to be sent also in coded form, the text of the code … is put together succinctly and clearly: it is to be written only as one copy, which is passed on to be encrypted.

Workers of all countries, unite!

Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks). Central Committee.

July 27, 1925

To comrade Pyatnitskiy.

By your request I am sending copies of the telegrams from comrade Stalin:

1) a copy of telegram # 32 from 25. VII,

2) “ “ # 33 from 26. VII.

2 — o. l.

To comrades comrades ZINOVIEV and TALIN. From Pyatnitskiy.

At yesterday’s meeting of the Presidium after a two-week discussion, the German delegation with the signatures of Geschke comma Schneller comma Kuhne and Neumann entered a declaration with an acknowledgement of all of their mistakes and a requirement to struggle in a decisive manner against the personal dictatorship in the Central Committee comma for the correction of mistakes and for the establishment of collective leadership in the party stop At the same time the Presidium and the German delegation have unanimously voted for the full approval of the work and speech by the IKKI delegation at the Parteitag stop A large committee on the German question has been elected comma which will take up the development of organizational guarantees comma which will establish the conduction of the IKKI line stop Included in this committee are representatives of the largest parties including the Czech Republic and Italy comma which called Moscow stop The decisive tactics by Bukharin gave the first results stop Ruth comma Telman and delegates from the regions have not arrived yet stop We have not received answers to a few of our telegrams from them yet stop In all likelihood Germany will not do without a serious struggle for a realization of the decisions made by the IKKI stop Despite the fact that Schneller signed signed a sharp declaration with an admission of mistakes comma he cannot be counted on stop But inside the Central Committee we will have a likely majority with Telman and Geschke at the head stop

30/ VII — 25

Copies forbidden

CODE

Sent from Sochi on 31/ VII 16 - 22 1925. Received in the Shifrburo of the RKP Central Committee for decoding on 31/ VII 1925 at h. 19 m. 40 VH # 1772/ Sh

MOSCOW RKP CC to comrade TOVSTUKHA

For comrade PYATNITSKIY from STALIN.

Received yours from the 30th. The success is clear, I welcome it, but that is only the first step, without organizational strengthening the success will amount to zero, for that reason we have to finish the job and draw all the organizational conclusions. # 37

STALIN. -

Decoded on 31/ VII 1925 at h. 20 m. 45 Printed in 3 copies. Decoded by S. Chistyakov

Drawn from the instructions:

1. The coded telegram should only be kept in secret locations.

2. In referencing the text of coded telegrams it is forbidden to indicate that the quoted text was received in code; likewise it is forbidden to indicate the numbers of coded messages.

3. A response to a coded message is to be sent also in coded form, the text of the code … is put together succinctly and clearly: it is to be written only as one copy, which is passed on to be encrypted.